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Abstract 
 
This article proposes ‘biopolitics multiple’ as an approach to the heterogeneity of biopolitical 
technologies deployed to govern migration today. Building on work that has started to 
develop analytical vocabularies to diagnose biopolitical technologies that work neither by 
fostering life nor by making people die in a necropolitical sense, it conceptualises ‘extraction’ 
and ‘subtraction’ as two such technologies that take ‘hold’ of migrants’ lives today. Extraction, 
explored in the paper through a focus on borderzones in Greece, captures the imbrication of 
biopolitics and value through the ‘outside’ creation of the economic conditions of data 
circulation. Subtraction, which is analysed in this article through a focus on Calais, captures 
the practices of (partial) non-governing by taking material and legal terrain away from 
migrants and reconfiguring convoluted geographies of (forced) hyper-mobility. This move 
allows us to understand the governmentality of migration beyond binary oppositions such as 
‘making live/letting die’, biopolitics/necropolitics and inclusion/exclusion.  
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Introduction  
 
 ‘MasterCard Prepaid Debit Cards Provide Refugees with Mobility, Flexibility 
and Dignity’.1 
 
‘We are not there to harass and assault them, we are there to make them 
move…’2 
 
 
1 Marisa Grimes, ‘MasterCard Prepaid Debit Cards Provide Refugees with Mobility, Flexibility and 
Dignity’, MasterCard, available at https://newsroom.mastercard.com/2016/06/20/mastercard-
prepaid-debit-cards-provide-refugees-with-mobility-flexibility-and-dignity/, last accessed 20 
September 2018. 
2 Quote from the police by Auberge des migrants, ‘‘On est pas là pour les harceler et les agresser, on 
est là pour les faire bouger’’,  available at 
https://twitter.com/AubergeMigrants/status/1034836611048108033?s=09 last accessed 24 August 
2019.  
 2 
From digital innovation to a wide array of repressive technologies, migration governmentality 
in Europe has been an intense site of transformation, particularly since what European states 
have defined as a ‘refugee crisis’.3 These two brief quotes are drawn from two different 
borderzones – one in  Greece, where asylum seekers are given prepaid debit cards by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the other in Calais in France, 
where migrants are constantly chased and moved by the police.  
Borderzones have been productively analysed through the lens of biopolitics as key 
sites in the transnational government of mobile bodies and the management of populations.4 
The concept of biopolitics has been mobilised to explain the modalities of power emerging 
with modernity and constitutive of our present, which take ‘life’ as the object of power and 
transform the ‘juridical subjects from whom we could collect good, and life too, moreover’t.5 
While illuminating an array of different practices in borderzones, biopolitics has also been 
criticised for its ‘thin’ understanding of race, Eurocentrism, and downplaying of resistance, 
repression and violence. For critics of Foucault’s concept, analyses that focus on biopolitics 
risks marginalising – even obscuring – the centrality of race to the hierarchisation of lives, and 
differential forms of subjection generated and sustained by racialised power mechanisms.6 
As we will discuss further down, International Relations (IR) scholars have addressed the 
limitations of biopolitics by supplementing the concept and associated practices with 
necropolitics, thanatopolitics or sovereignty to capture the multiple ways in in which death 
continues to be juxtaposed to life in the governing of the present.  
 
 
 
 
3 While there has been a lot of debate about the use of categories of ‘migrant’, ‘refugee’ and ‘asylum 
seeker’, we use ‘migrant’ as the overarching category where statuses are blurred in practice (as in 
the case of Calais). Where the legal status of a person is directly relevant to practices, as in the case 
of the prepaid cards in Greece, we use tend to use the referent of ‘refugee’ as only those who apply 
for asylum and humanitarian protection can have access to the prepaid card. By not drawing fast 
distinctions in practice, we try to avoid the reification of categories and show not only how statuses 
are blurred in practice, but that they a particular legal status can be withdrawn and reallocated. 
There is a wide literature reflecting on the categories of ‘migrant’ and ‘refugee’. For recent 
reflection, see Heaven Crawley and Dimitris Skleparis, ‘Refugees, migrants, neither, both: categorical 
fetishism and the politics of bounding in Europe’s ‘migration crisis’’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies 44, no. 1 (2018): 48-64. 
4 For example William Walters, ‘Mapping Schengenland: denaturalizing the border’, Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space 20, no. 5 (2002): 561-80; Benjamin J. Muller, Security, Risk and the 
Biometric State: Governing Borders and Bodies (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009); Nick Vaughan-Williams, 
EUrope's Border Crisis: Biopolitical security and beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); 
Martina Tazzioli, The Making of Migration. The biopolitics of mobility at Europe’s borders (London: 
Sage, 2019).  
5 Michel Foucault, ‘The Mesh of Power’,  Viewpoint (1976 [2012]), 
https://www.viewpointmag.com/2012/09/12/the-mesh-of-power/, Last Accessed 17 October 2017. 
6 Achille Mbembe, ‘Necropolitics’, Public Culture 15, no. 1 (2003): 11-40; Patricia Ticineto Clough and 
Craig Willse, Beyond biopolitics: Essays on the governance of life and death (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2011); Stefanie Fishel and Lauren Wilcox, ‘Politics of the Living Dead: Race and 
Exceptionalism in the Apocalypse’, Millennium 45, no. 3 (2017): 335-55. 
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These supplementary concepts have been particularly productive for recent critical 
engagements with border and migration governmentality.7 While attention to the multiplicity 
and multiplication of biopolitical technologies has also informed recent work on migration 
and borders, we argue that we need to further extend and nuance the vocabularies of 
biopolitics to understand the transformations of migration governmentality today. We 
develop ‘biopolitics multiple’ as a methodological device to attend to how biopolitical 
technologies are deployed in practice, how they are enacted differently from site to site, while 
still somehow ‘hanging together’. 8  As our title suggests, echoing Annemarie Mol’s Body 
Multiple, we propose to unsettle binary oppositions such as inclusion/exclusion, 
biopolitics/necropolitics, affirmative biopolitics/negative biopolitics, making live/letting die 
that have undergirded much work on biopolitical technologies of governing.9 Focused on the 
life of asylum seekers, the two quotes we start with also indicate that something more is at 
stake in biopolitical technologies of governing than the politics of life and death. By 
developing an understanding of biopolitics beyond life/death, this article makes a 
contribution to the critical literature on migration and, at the same time, it takes migration as 
a terrain for rethinking contemporary biopolitical technologies more broadly.  
In taking migration as a site of inquiry, we ask how we can account for modes of power 
and political technologies10 that do not work through fostering life and do not make people 
die. Which ‘hold’ over migrant lives is at stake that does not fall under the biopolitical couplet 
of ‘making live/letting die’?11 How do we conceptualise technologies of power that do not 
just ‘make a division between good and bad circulation’? 12  What are the effects of a 
discontinuous ‘hold’ over migrants’ lives, made of some sites and moments in which migrants 
are highly controlled and others in which their movements are managed through (partial) 
non-governing, not-seeing and non-registration? We propose to conceptualise two modes of 
biopolitical governing as extraction and subtraction. The key argument of the paper is that 
extractive and subtractive biopolitics allows us to attend to reconfigurations of power today 
and develop critical vocabularies to address analytical impasses not only around migration 
 
7 See Vaughan-Williams, EUrope's Border Crisis: Biopolitical security and beyond; Luca Mavelli, 
‘Governing populations through the humanitarian government of refugees: Biopolitical care and 
racism in the European refugee crisis’, Review of International Studies 43, no. 5 (2017): 809-32; 
Özgün E Topak, ‘The Biopolitical Border in Practice: Surveillance and Death at the Greece-Turkey 
Borderzones’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 32, no. 5 (2014): 815-33; Vicki Squire, 
‘Governing migration through death in Europe and the US: Identification, burial and the crisis of 
modern humanism’, European Journal of International Relations 23, no. 3 (2017): 513-32. 
8 Annemarie Mol, The Body Multiple: Ontology in medical practice (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2002). 
9 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2013); Judith Revel, ‘Identity, nature, life: Three biopolitical 
deconstructions’, Theory, Culture & Society 26, no. 6 (2009): 45-54. 
10 Following Foucault’s definition, we use ‘political technologies’ as a set of knowledges, practices 
and operations ‘which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or 
domination’. Michel Foucault, ‘The Political technology of individuals’,in Technologies of the Self: A 
seminar with Michel Foucault, ed. Michel Foucault, et al. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1988), 145-62,18. 
11  Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Volume I (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). 
12 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007), 34. 
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governmentality, but also biopolitics more broadly. For instance, as this paper questions, how 
should we conceptualise border governmentality beyond strategies of killing and letting die? 
The conceptual apparatus of ‘extraction’ and ‘subtraction’ helps us highlight relations 
between biopolitics, circulation and mobility, thereby attending to intersections with political 
economic and racial formations. 
While extraction is a familiar concept to literatures on neoliberalism and political 
economy, the concept has not been deployed in relation to biopolitics. Recently, Sandro 
Mezzadra and Brett Neilson have proposed to move beyond the literal meaning of extraction 
of natural resources to encompass much wider operations of capital which include, for 
instance, modes of value extraction from social cooperation. 13  Drawing on this initial 
expansion, we develop a conceptualisation of extractive biopolitics to investigate the modes 
of value extraction from migrants’ mobility that are at stake through the intertwining of 
humanitarian interventions and digital economies. In this paper, we propose to investigate 
extraction in relation to circulation of data as well as to the infrastructures that are 
constitutive of digital economies and data exchanges today.  
Unlike extraction, subtraction is a concept that has rarely surfaced in social sciences. 
We engage with the work of the architectural theorist Keller Easterling, who has articulated 
subtraction in relation to building removal, to similarly advance the concept and argue for its 
relevance as a biopolitical technology. 14  Through the lens of subtractive biopolitics, we 
interrogate how migrant subjectivities are shaped and targeted beyond the binary opposition 
between migrants’ agency and victimhood that underpins migration scholarship. Political 
technologies for governing migration produce a whole range of modes of subjection that fall 
in-between those two oppositional figures of subjectivity. As this paper illustrates, migrants 
are deprived of spaces of livability and infrastructures of support and they are entrapped into 
forced hyper-mobility. Such a forced hyper-mobility, we contend, might be seen as an effect 
of subtraction insofar as migrants are disrupted in their movements and pace of mobility. 
To explore these technologies of extraction and subtraction, we start from two 
borderzones in Europe.15 Our selection of official hotspots in Greece and informal hotspots in 
Calais in France is due to their situatedness as key sites of governmental invention and 
experimentation. 16  Moreover, far from being migration hotspots that emerge suddenly, 
these sites have a specific migration history, and Calais in particular has been a violent 
borderzone for migrants since the mid-1990s. On a methodological level, it is important to 
 
13 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, ‘On the multiple frontiers of extraction: excavating 
contemporary capitalism’, Cultural Studies 31, no. 2-3 (2017): 185-204. 
14 Keller Easterling, Subtraction, Critical Spatial Practice 4 (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2014)., 
15 See Vicki Squire, ed. The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2011). 
16 We refer to migration as a site of experimentation throughout the paper, to highlight that the 
political technologies implemented for governing and controlling migrants are partly used also in 
other fields. Many critical migration scholars have used the language of laboratories of 
experimentation where a series of policies, laws and technologies are tested. While there are 
important differences from the use of the ‘laboratory thesis’ in the Israel-Palestine context, Rhys 
Machold has raised a set of cautionary notes about the theoretical, empirical and normative use of 
the concept. Rhys Machold, ‘Reconsidering the laboratory thesis: Palestine/Israel and the geopolitics 
of representation’, Political Geography 65 (2018): 88-97. 
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avoid the trap of ‘presentism’17 that risks corroborating state narratives of a ‘refugee crisis’. 
Our selection also requires a further methodological clarification: in interrogating the 
techniques and the specific ‘hold’ over migrants, we do not propose an overarching analytics 
that would subsume the heterogeneity of migration contexts. Indeed, there are important 
differences between the ways in which migrants are governed soon after landing, and how 
their presence and movements are managed at the internal frontiers of Europe, or in sites 
where the EU has externalised its borders. Far from disregarding such heterogeneity, we 
contend that the unevenness of modes of government or ‘biopolitics multiple’ is what 
characterises the current European migration politics. Such unevenness inevitably generates 
uncertainty and disorientation for the migrants, making it hard to grasp how the EU border 
regime works. In introducing the notion of ‘biopolitics multiple’, we also need to ask which 
subjectivities these heterogenous political technologies shape and foster. We show that 
‘biopolitics multiple’ has important political implications for migrant subjectivities, as these 
heterogeneous technologies which hang together without being coherent also produce 
ambiguity, uncertainty and disorientation. 
Methodologically, we start from moments in which governing technologies become 
contested in these borderzones and follow how these contestations unravel in order to grasp 
the specificity of biopolitical technologies. Technologies gain (limited) public visibility as these 
become challenged by various non-state actors, migrant groups themselves (both through 
online and offline means), and even by state actors. These contestations unravel through 
governmental inquiries, NGO reports, legal cases and online posts, which help us trace the 
contours and the messy deployment of these technologies.18 Following these contestations  
means that we suspend assumptions about who ‘counts’ and trace a multiplicity of actors 
who come to contest biopolitical technologies and their deployment on the ground. 
To develop the conceptualisation of ‘biopolitics multiple’, we proceed in three steps. 
Firstly, we discuss how critical scholarship on migration and borders has engaged with 
literatures expanding and critiquing the concept of biopolitics more broadly. Secondly, we 
introduce the concept of extraction to diagnose technologies of extractive biopolitics in the 
governing of migration in Greece. Thirdly, we introduce the concept of subtraction and 
analyse the technologies of subtractive biopolitics in another site of intense migration 
governmentality in Europe – Calais. We conclude by discussing the political implications of 
these biopolitical technologies and their heterogeneity for migrant subjectivity and 
contemporary biopolitics more broadly. 
 
Beyond the politics of life and death 
 
Critical scholarship on migration governmentality has interrogated the specific politics of life 
and death underpinning the technologies which sort populations into lives worth saving and 
 
17 William Walters, ‘Foucault and frontiers: Notes on the birth of the humanitarian border’,in 
Governmentality; Current Issues and Future Challenges, ed. Ulrich Krasmann Bröckling, Susanne 
Lemke, Thomas (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 146-72,142. 
18 While some of the observations contained in the paper stem from fieldwork conducted in Greece 
(Lesvos and Athens) and in France (Calais), we have decided to draw on the vast array of documents 
produced and deployed as part of the public contestations of these technologies in 2017 and 2018. 
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those left to die. 19  Following Foucault, the literature on migration governmentality has 
critically pointed to the divisions and exclusions which are fostered between ‘host 
populations’, whose life and wealth should be enhanced, and the racialised refugees who, 
from a state-based perspective, would threaten the well-being of the former. 20  These 
distinctions underpin the continuum of humanitarianism, migration management and 
biopolitical warfare as ‘a form of hybrid warfare’, which works ‘through heterogeneous 
techniques […] that act on migrants as singular individuals and, at the same time, as part of 
transnational populations on the move’21.  
Recent literatures have not only attended to the inventiveness of biopolitical 
technologies, but they have also addressed the limitations of approaching biopolitical control 
through the binary of ‘making live/letting die’. In highlighting the heterogeneity of practices 
of biopolitical control, critical literatures can be read as following three different paths in 
relation to the conceptualisation of biopolitics: supplementing, specifying or displacing the 
concept of biopolitics.  
Firstly, for many authors, the heterogeneity of practices requires supplementing the 
concept of biopolitics. IR scholars, particularly in the field of border and migration studies, 
have largely adopted the first approach. They have productively built on the critiques of 
biopolitics, particularly arguments that biopolitics needs to be supplemented by either 
necropolitics - conceived by Achille Mbembe as the ‘contemporary forms of subjugation of 
life to the power of death’ 22  - or thanatopolitics – defined by Giorgio Agamben as the 
moment when ‘the decision on life becomes a decision on death’.23 This supplementation 
exposes the co-constitution of life- and death-impulses in the contemporary government of 
life and the racialised constitution of the ‘living dead’, a term which denotes forms of 
existence characterised by social, political and physical death. 24  The biopolitical, 
thanatopolitical and necropolitical are particularly intensified in the government of migration, 
as death becomes a ‘routine or normalised dimension of contemporary bordering 
practices’. 25  What characterises these biopolitical spaces in which life is administered, 
monitored and surveyed is the drawing of boundaries, the hierarchisation of life, and the 
proliferation and intensification of violence. Other scholars have called for a renewed 
attention to sovereignty in the light of biopolitical modes of government, arguing that such a 
 
19 Vaughan-Williams, EUrope's Border Crisis: Biopolitical security and beyond; Squire, ‘Governing 
migration through death in Europe and the US: Identification, burial and the crisis of modern 
humanism’; Adrian Little and Nick Vaughan-Williams, ‘Stopping boats, saving lives, securing subjects: 
Humanitarian borders in Europe and Australia’, European Journal of International Relations 23, no. 3 
(2017): 533-56. 
20 Mavelli, ‘Governing populations through the humanitarian government of refugees: Biopolitical 
care and racism in the European refugee crisis’, 811. 
21 Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli, ‘The biopolitical warfare on migrants: EU Naval Force and 
NATO operations of migration government in the Mediterranean’, Critical Military Studies  (2017): 1-
20,4. 
22 Mbembe, ‘Necropolitics’, 39. 
23 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 122. 
24 Mbembe, ‘Necropolitics’, 39-40. 
25 Squire, ‘Governing migration through death in Europe and the US: Identification, burial and the 
crisis of modern humanism’, 514. 
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theme remains in fact quite marginalised and overshadowed both in Foucault’s work and in 
contemporary analyses on biopolitics.26 Thus, borderzones are analysed as spaces where 
‘sovereign territorial surveillance, practices of death and exclusion, and suspension of rights 
are all central aspects of biopolitical control’.27  
Nick Vaughan-Williams has pushed further the critical engagement with the notion of 
biopolitics, arguing for an analysis that moves beyond the opposition between affirmative 
biopolitics - which centres on the power of life rather than power over life, as discussed by 
authors like Toni Negri - and negative biopolitics or thanatopolitics – which builds on Giorgio 
Agamben’s work to highlight the production of bare life as constitutive of sovereign power. 
For Vaughan-Williams, the opposition between a thanatopolitical and vital biopolitics which 
characterises the literature on migration cannot be sustained in practice, as ‘the EU’s 
humanitarian approach to border security at once encompasses both the discourse of control 
and that of migrant agency’.28 Katharyne Mitchell and Matthew Sparke have also called for 
‘adapt[ing] Foucauldian arguments about “making live” and “rejecting into death” in modern 
biopolitics in order to come to terms with a wide range of intermediate experiences of 
“subcitizenship” between the poles of biopolitical enfranchisement and necropolitical 
rejection’.29 The generality of biopolitics understood as the management of individuals and 
populations cannot account, in their view, for the multiplicity of experiences and technologies 
of biopolitical power. 
Therefore, what is key to these moves of supplementing biopolitics is the analytical 
attention to heterogeneous practices, to how different rationalities and technologies of 
biopolitical governmentality co-exist and are entangled.30 For instance, the refugee camp as 
a ‘spatial political technology’ is characterised by biopolitical modes of governance where 
forms of abandonment, colonial technologies for managing populations and humanitarian 
control coexist. 31  Recent works have also drawn attention to the specific biopolitical 
 
26 François Debrix and Alexander D Barder, Beyond Biopolitics: Theory, Violence, and Horror in World 
Politics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); Banu Bargu, Starve and Immolate: The Politics of Human 
Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014). On borderzones, see for instance Reece 
Jones et al., ‘Interventions on the state of sovereignty at the border’, Political Geography 59 (2017): 
1-10. 
27  Topak, ‘The Biopolitical Border in Practice: Surveillance and Death at the Greece-Turkey 
Borderzones’, 816. 
28 Vaughan-Williams, EUrope's Border Crisis: Biopolitical security and beyond, 12 italics in original. 
29 Katharyne Mitchell and Matthew Sparke, ‘Hotspot geopolitics versus geosocial solidarity: 
Contending constructions of safe space for migrants in Europe’, Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space 0, no. 0 (2018): 0263775818793647,2. 
30 Thom Davies, Arshad Isakjee, and Surindar Dhesi, ‘Violent Inaction: The Necropolitical Experience 
of Refugees in Europe’, Antipode 49, no. 5 (2017): 1263-84; Michael McIntyre and Heidi J. Nast, 
‘Bio(necro)polis: Marx, Surplus Populations, and the Spatial Dialectics of Reproduction and “Race”1’, 
Antipode 43, no. 5 (2011): 1465-88; Jill M Williams, ‘From humanitarian exceptionalism to 
contingent care: Care and enforcement at the humanitarian border’, Political Geography 47 (2015): 
11-20. 
31 Mark B. Salter, ‘The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: 
Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics’, Alternatives 31, no. 2 (2006): 167–89; Claudio Minca, ‘Geographies of 
the camp’, Political Geography 49 (2015): 74-83; see also Alison Mountz, ‘The enforcement 
archipelago: Detention, haunting, and asylum on islands’, Political Geography 30, no. 3 (2011): 118-
28. 
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technologies that are at play in governing refugees at sea, speaking of a ‘biopolitical warfare’ 
that consists in military actors, such as the Navy, that are involved both in rescuing and 
containing migrants in the Mediterranean. 32  Others, such as Polly Pallister-Wilkins, have 
reflected on biopolitical modes of intervention which target the migrants in the recently 
established EU hotspots, showing how the humanitarian logic of ‘care and control’ is 
intertwined with forms of administrative violence.33 
 A second approach reads heterogeneity as an impetus to specify biopolitics and 
distinguish it from ‘politics of life’. In our reading, specifying biopolitics entails tracing its 
boundaries both conceptually and in practice. Several scholars have taken issue with the 
generality of a concept that can become too encompassing and have argued in favour of 
distinctions that specify, rather than supplement biopolitics. Specifying biopolitics 
distinguishes it from other governmental technologies. For instance, while acknowledging 
that, historically, ‘the border crossing has become for thousands of migrants […] a matter of 
life and death’, William Walters has noted that the functioning of the humanitarian border is 
not predicated upon the enhancement of life nor on pastoral power, but on the ‘provision of 
bare necessities’.34 Didier Fassin has also warned against the use of the term biopolitics to 
illustrate the rationale of humanitarianism as what is at stake is a ‘politics of life’ that targets 
and selects migrants individually, and not biopolitical mechanisms apt at governing 
populations for enhancing them.35  
A third engagement with the limitations of biopolitics unpacks the heterogeneity of 
practices by attending to entanglements between biopolitics, neoliberal capitalism and 
racialisation. This means that biopolitics also becomes displaced to some extent, given its 
inability to capture a range of other practices of governmentality. The literature on biopolitics 
and (neoliberal) political economy has focused on migrant bodies and their commodification 
as labour. As Thomas Lemke has argued, ‘the instrumentalization of life cannot be separated 
from its capitalization’.36 As part of this strand of research, scholars writing on the ‘migration 
industry’ have relied on the centrality of labour and emphasised modes of value extraction 
through the commodification of migrant bodies, for instance by private actors making profit 
from migrants’ forced immobilisation in detention centres, or modes of capitalisation on 
reproductive labour.37 Ultimately, ‘[i]t is the labour involved in managing, facilitating and 
 
32 Garelli and Tazzioli, ‘The biopolitical warfare on migrants: EU Naval Force and NATO operations of 
migration government in the Mediterranean’. 
33 Polly Pallister-Wilkins, ‘Hotspots and the geographies of humanitarianism’, Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 0, no. 0: 0263775818754884. 
34 Walters, ‘Foucault and frontiers: Notes on the birth of the humanitarian border’, 138, 56. 
35 Didier Fassin, ‘Humanitarianism as a Politics of Life’, Public Culture 19, no. 3 (2007): 499. 
36 Thomas Lemke, ‘Biopolitics and beyond. On the reception of a vital Foucauldian notion ’,  available 
at http://www.biopolitica.org/docs/Biopolitics_and_beyond.pdf, last accessed 16 December 2017. 
37 Ruben Andersson, Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014); Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Ninna Nyberg 
Sorensen, eds., The Migration industry and the Commercialization of International Migration 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); Nancy Hiemstra and Deirdre Conlon, ‘Beyond privatization: 
bureaucratization and the spatialities of immigration detention expansion’, Territory, Politics, 
Governance 5, no. 3 (2017): 252-68. 
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controlling migration that makes this an industry’.38 Recent studies have contributed to this 
debate from a slightly different angle, focusing on the ‘logistification of migration regimes’ 
and on the governmental fantasy of a ‘just-in-time and to-the-point labor migration’.39 For 
instance, Altenried et al. have described the EU Hotspot Approach40 as ‘the channeling of 
turbulent, unpredictable, and autonomous movements of mass migration through ‘spaces of 
exception and governmentalized routes’. 41  What is key to this literature is the 
commodification of migrant labour, and therefore logistification attends to the structures of 
intermediation – discursive and material – through which migrant life is subsumed to a bio-
economic rationality. 
The analysis of entanglements between biopolitics and racialisation has remained the 
most debated field of critical analysis. The literature on biopolitics – as deployed in migration 
and border studies, but also in security studies – has been criticised for the ‘flickering 
presence’ of race, its erasure through Agambenian readings of biopolitics or ‘whitewashing’ 
race in Foucauldian security studies.42 As Alexander Weheliye poignantly argues, 
 
Bare life and biopolitics discourse not only misconstrues how profoundly race and 
racism shape the modern idea of the human, it also overlooks or perfunctorily writes 
off theorizations of race, subjection, and humanity found in black and ethnic studies, 
allowing bare life and biopolitics discourse to imagine an indivisible biological 
substance anterior to racialization.43  
 
In starting from the Foucauldian framework of biopolitics, critical literatures on border and 
migration studies have often approached race and the production of racialised bodies as 
derivative of a ‘biopolitical cut’ and have thus paid less attention to the constitutive role of 
race. Thus, the language of ‘modern biopolitical racism’ versus ‘traditional forms of racism’ 
 
38 Sophie Cranston, Joris Schapendonk, and Ernst Spaan, ‘New directions in exploring the migration 
industries: introduction to special issue’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies  (2017): 1-15. 
39 Moritz Altenried et al., ‘Logistical Borderscapes: Politics and Mediation of Mobile Labor in 
Germany after the “Summer of Migration”’, South Atlantic Quarterly 117, no. 2 (2018): 291-312; 
Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, ‘Extraction, logistics, finance: global crisis and the politics of 
operations’, Radical Philosophy 178, no. March/April (2013): 8-18.  
40 European Commission, ‘Hotspot Approach’,  available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-
we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/hotspot-approach_en, last 
accessed 8 October 2019. 
41 Altenried et al., ‘Logistical Borderscapes: Politics and Mediation of Mobile Labor in Germany after 
the “Summer of Migration”’, 292. 
42 Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, ‘Racism in Foucauldian Security Studies: Biopolitics, 
Liberal War, and the Whitewashing of Colonial and Racial Violence’, International Political Sociology 
13, no. 1 (2018): 2-19; Leila Whitley, ‘The disappearance of race: A critique of the use of Agamben in 
border and migration scholarship’, Borderlands 16, no. 1 (2017): 1-23; David Moffette and William 
Walters, ‘Flickering Presence: Theorizing Race and Racism in the Governmentality of Borders and 
Migration’, Studies in Social Justice 12, no. 1 (2018): 92. 
43 Alexander G Weheliye, Habeas Viscus: Racializing assemblages, biopolitics, and black feminist 
theories of the human (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 4. 
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also appears in critical work on migration.44 This risks restating  ‘an ontological differentiation 
between ethnic and biopolitical racism, leaving the door open for the naturalization of racial 
categories and the existence of a biological sphere that is not always already subject to ethnic 
racism’.45 To avoid the foreclosure of race, it is important to attend to the mechanisms of 
racialisation through which some subjects are labelled, hierarchised and differentially 
governed as ‘migrants’. That is, more than focusing on the racialised body as such, there is a 
need to investigate the political technologies through which new distinctions and hierarchies 
of life are produced. We foreground the mechanisms of racialisation that are constantly 
reconfigured or what can be called a move from an ontology of race towards the ‘how’ of 
racialisation. 46  Alongside analyses that have highlighted the racialised definition of 
‘humanity’, which has historically produced hierarchies between human, less-than-human 
and sub-human subjects, racialising assemblages can help attend to the reconfigurations and 
displacements that emerging technologies enact.47  
The recent criticisms of the erasure, downplaying or whitewashing of race in the IR 
literature have drawn attention to the concerns raised in the work of postcolonial scholars 
such as Ann Laura Stoler, Alexander Weheliye, Fred Moten or Jasbir Puar about the treatment 
of race in Michel Foucault’s, Giorgio Agamben’s or Hannah Arendt’s writings. Jasbir Puar, for 
example, has proposed to recalibrate an analytics of biopolitics to attend to the effects of 
debilitation and incapacitation that biopolitical control has for racialised bodies that are 
prepared for maiming, impairment or wearing out.48 For her, biopolitics ‘deployed through 
its neoliberal guises is a capacitation machine’ and thus her project is to contribute to 
developing a critical lexicon and analytical toolbox.49 Similarly, we propose expanding our 
critical vocabularies by attending to the technologies of ‘biopolitics multiple’.  
Building on the heterogeneity of practices and administrative measures mobilised by 
state authorities for regaining control over migration, firstly, we explore how the ‘hold’ on 
migrants as a population is enacted in practice. Starting with enactments allows us to 
approach biopolitics not as a homogenous binary logic, but as plural technologies, which are 
simultaneously dispersed and connected, while being entangled with technologies of 
capitalisation and racialisation. Secondly, we also propose to move beyond the binaries of 
life/death, biopolitics/necropolitics. Even when heterogenous practices are analysed to 
supplement Foucault’s conceptualisation of biopolitics, these are overlaid with the modified 
formula of making live/making die. Rather than adding a third term or a replacement term 
for biopolitics, we argue that it is more productive to attend to ‘biopolitics multiple’ in order 
 
44 For instance, Mavelli, ‘Governing populations through the humanitarian government of refugees: 
Biopolitical care and racism in the European refugee crisis’, 818. 
45 Weheliye, Habeas Viscus: Racializing assemblages, biopolitics, and black feminist theories of the 
human, 59. 
46 For a fundamental contribution on this, see Sylvia Wynter, ‘Unsettling the coloniality of 
being/power/truth/freedom: Towards the human, after man, its overrepresentation—An argument’, 
CR: The new centennial review 3, no. 3 (2003): 257-337. 
47 Weheliye, Habeas Viscus: Racializing assemblages, biopolitics, and black feminist theories of the 
human. Ann Laura Stoler, Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2016). 
48 Jasbir K Puar, The Right to Maim: Debility, capacity, disability (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2017). 
49 Puar, The Right to Maim: Debility, capacity, disability. 
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to analyse not only different technologies of biopolitical control and their entanglements as 
in the third approach we have outlined, but the effects of their inclusive disjunction.50 The 
following two sections start from our own encounters with, and attempts to understand, 
conceptualise and critically engage with technologies of biopolitical control in two different 
borderzones in Europe.  
 
  
Extractive biopolitics 
 
Since 2015, Greece has been a fertile terrain for governing migration, as well as a space where 
new assemblages of security and humanitarian practices have emerged. With the progressive 
closure of the Balkan route and the signature of the EU-Turkey Deal in March 2016, Greece 
has been transformed from a space of transit into a space of protracted migration 
containment.51 To address some of the challenges of managing migration in Greece, the EU 
and the UNHCR have implemented a centralised debit card system (the Refugee Cash 
Assistance Programme) to provide monthly financial support to asylum seekers. 52  The 
programme, which became fully operational in 2017, is currently led by UNHCR in 
cooperation with Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the International Federation of the Red 
Cross for the delivery of a single type of debit card across the whole Greek territory.  
In summer 2018, around 100 migrants occupied the offices of CRS/UNHCR claiming 
access to the debit card. They had been waiting for months to receive the card or to actually 
have money loaded on the card. The protests went on for months in 2018. In their statement 
on the protests, the UNHCR highlighted the biopolitical apparatus of governing through the 
card: ‘Every applicant’s eligibility is assessed on the basis of date of entry in Greece, legal 
status and location before assistance can be provided, and this process can cause delays’.53 
The card is a technology of differentiation and access to assistance. However, the statement 
did not mention how the debit card controls refugees by disqualifying ‘unruly’ mobility and 
conducts. For instance, those who leave the islands to come to the mainland lose their right 
to the prepaid card. The same happens to those who do not accept living in the 
accommodation provided by the Greek authorities (refugee camps, apartments or hotspots) 
and who move to squats or apartments without an official rental contract.  
 
50 According to Brian Massumi, ‘inclusive disjunction’ refers to the co-presence of a number of terms 
whose proximity renders them as both/and rather than either/or. ,  (!!! INVALID CITATION !!! ). 
51 Anja Karlsson Franck, ‘The Lesvos Refugee Crisis as Disaster Capitalism’, Peace Review 30, no. 2 
(2018): 199-205; Martina Tazzioli, ‘Containment through Mobility. The Hotspot System and the 
troubled Geographies of Asylum in the Mediterranean’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies  
(2017). 
52 UNHCR, ‘Cash Card Assistance’,  available at http://donors.unhcr.gr/echo/en/category/cash-card-
assistance/, last accessed 16 December 2017. Greece is not the only country where asylum seekers 
receive pre-paid cards, although it is the first in Europe where an EU-funded programme had been 
implemented. Refugee Cash Assistance Programmes have proliferated in the Middle East Region in 
response to the Syrian refugee crisis, in particular in refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey.  
53 UNHCR, ‘UNHCR concerned after protesters occupy Athens cash assistance centre’, UNHCR, 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/gr/en/10460-unhcr-concerned-after-protesters-occupy-athens-
cash-assistance-centre.html, last accessed 15 August 2018. 
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Financial support is also a temporary measure, which is intended to assist migrants in 
transit through Greece and through the process of applying for asylum.54 As the UNCHR 
explains, ‘This card will not function and will be permanently deactivated if used outside of 
Greece’.55 Access to financial support is subjected to an individual pre-screening procedure 
that determines if the applicant matches the eligibility criteria for cash assistance. The 
eligibility criteria apply to refugees who arrived in the country after 1 January 2015, who are 
registered by the Greek authorities and have a valid asylum card or Police notice, and who 
reside in the country.56 While prepaid cards are seen by the UNHCR as technology to enhance 
refugees’ autonomy, paradoxically, refugees are obstructed from the possibility to choose 
where to live in order to get the card.57 
Thus, the cash card needs to be understood as a technology of biopolitical control, as 
only those migrants with an asylum card and who accept to live in reception centres can 
receive a card and the monthly top-up. Monthly ‘verification’ of their right to the card, 
including location, family status and asylum application status, means that some migrants are 
continually excluded/reincluded in the system. Hence, access to the cash card is entwined 
with the production of profiles and categories of risk, such as potential terrorists. Refugees 
are subjected to ‘social sorting’,58 so that the ones who benefit from financial inclusion are 
the ones who are governable. Ungovernable or unruly refugees become ‘punished’ either 
through exclusion from the prepaid card or through delays in the allocation of cards.  
If the prepaid cards are deployed to govern migration and discipline mobility in similar 
ways to checkpoints and travel documents,59 we also need to supplement this biopolitical 
deployment of the cards with an understanding of extractive technologies that turn refugees’ 
bodies and their movements into quantifiable digital data. The use of financial tools for 
governing refugees ‘creates digital footprints’.60 Refugees become datafied, made legible as 
digital data, in order to be made governable. The literature on migration has already explored 
the wide-ranging and diverse practices of the datafication of migration 61  as well as the 
 
54 Daniela Gabor and Sally Brooks, ‘The digital revolution in financial inclusion: international 
development in the fintech era’, New Political Economy 22, no. 4 (2017): 423-36. 
55 UNHCR, ‘Access to cash assistance’, UNHCR, available at http://help.unhcr.org/greece/living-in-
greece/access-to-cash-assistance/, last accessed 8 November 2018. 
56 UNHCR, ‘The Greece Cash Assistance’, UNHCR, available at http://www.unhcr.org/5a14306a7.pdf, 
last accessed 25 February 2018. 
57 See Martina Tazzioli, ‘Refugees’ subjectivities, debit cards and data circuits. Financial-
humanitarianism in the Greek migration laboratory’, International Political Sociology  (2019). 
58 David Lyon, ed. Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, risk, and automated discrimination (London: 
Routledge, 2002). 
59 Beste İşleyen, ‘Transit mobility governance in Turkey’, Political Geography 62 (2018): 23-32; Polly 
Pallister-Wilkins, ‘How walls do work: Security barriers as devices of interruption and data capture’, 
Security Dialogue 47, no. 2 (2016): 151-64. 
60 Gabor and Brooks, ‘The digital revolution in financial inclusion: international development in the 
fintech era’, 7. 
61 Louise Amoore, The Politics of Possibility: Risk and security beyond probability (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2014); Dennis Broeders and Huub Dijstelbloem, ‘The Datafication of Mobility and 
Migration Management’,in Digitizing Identities: Doing Identity in a Networked World, ed. Irma van 
der Ploeg and Jason Pridmore (New York: Routledge, 2015), 242-60. 
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peculiar functioning of digital technologies in refugee humanitarianism.62 Whether through 
biometric control or through mining vast swathes of data to produce risk profiles, the 
literature on datafication has focused on the intensification of control and the transformation 
of sites of sovereign decision.63  
Yet, there is something else at stake in the deployment and use of prepaid cards, 
which concerns the nexus between biopolitics and political economy. We propose 
understanding the datafication of refugees’ movements and lives as a biopolitical technology 
of extraction rather than simply ‘social sorting’ and inclusion/exclusion. Notably, in Critique 
of Black Reason, Achille Mbembe has associated the production of blackness to the 
production of a ‘body of extraction’.64 To some extent, the body of the refugee can be also 
seen as a surface of extraction of data and potential value. Ruben Andersson has used the 
notion of ‘predatory economies’ to describe extractive mechanisms that are at stake in the 
field of migration governmentality and that are not narrowed to the capitalisation over 
migrant labour force.65 He questions ‘how migrants and their bodies were rendered ‘useful’ 
beyond their labor power’, for instance by capitalising on ‘migrants' lived time’ and vitality.66  
Mezzadra and Neilson have offered a helpful extension and rethinking of extraction 
by moving beyond the widely used sense that has associated it either with a sector of capital 
or with processes of ‘re-primarization’ of economies in Latin America.67 They point to the 
‘prevalence and strategic role of extractive operations in contemporary capitalism’, 
highlighting that these are at play ‘not only when the operations of capital plunder the 
materiality of the earth and biosphere, but also when they encounter and draw upon forms 
and practices of human cooperation and sociality that are external to them’.68 Extraction is 
therefore relevant to capitalist processes more broadly, including to the domains of finance 
and logistics. It captures the relations of appropriation and expropriation that capital 
establishes with its ‘outsides’.69 The literature analysing accumulation, extraction and the 
commodification of migrant lives has focused on the production of value as economic profit. 
Nevertheless, what remains partially under-theorised is the relationship between extractive 
technologies, biopolitics and forms of value generated through data collection and circulation 
 
62 Katja Lindskov Jacobsen, The Politics of Humanitarian Technology: Good intentions, unintended 
consequences and insecurity (London: Routledge, 2015); Katja Lindskov Jacobsen and Kristin 
Bergtora Sandvik, ‘UNHCR and the pursuit of international protection: accountability through 
technology?’, Third World Quarterly  (2018): 1-17. 
63 Didier Bigo, ‘The (in)securitization practices of the three universes of EU border control: 
Military/Navy – border guards/police – database analysts’, Security Dialogue 45, no. 3 (2014): 209-
25. 
64 Achille Mbembe, Critique of Black Reason (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017), 18. 
65 Ruben Andersson, ‘Profits and Predation in the Human Bioeconomy’, Public Culture 30, no. 3 
(2018): 413-39,435. 
66 Andersson, ‘Profits and Predation in the Human Bioeconomy’, 424, 26. 
67 Neo-extractivism has been rearticulated in debates about post-neoliberalism in Latin America e.g. 
Maristella Svampa, ‘Commodities consensus: Neoextractivism and enclosure of the commons in 
Latin America’, South Atlantic Quarterly 114, no. 1 (2015): 65-82. 
68 Mezzadra and Neilson, ‘On the multiple frontiers of extraction: excavating contemporary 
capitalism’, 188. 
69 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, The Politics of Operations: Excavating contemporary 
capitalism (Durham, CA: Duke University Press, 2019). 
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and that centre on refugees’ mobility as such. We explore the mechanisms of extraction that 
capitalise on refugees' mobility by rendering them into data. 
While extraction has been used to render the operations of capital, we argue that the 
concept of extraction is particularly apt to reconnect analyses of biopolitics with political 
economy, while also supplementing the binaries of affirmative/negative biopolitics. 70 
Contemporary biopolitical technologies also work through data extraction, which depends on 
infrastructures of circulation of the data collected from the refugees. Rather than filtering 
good and bad circulation, refugees’ movements become a source of value by yielding data 
that is processed through digital infrastructures. Data extractive technologies do not entail 
more individualised surveillance. In Greece, once refugees are temporarily included in the 
prepaid card system, there is no particular individualised ‘hold’ on them. While refugees could 
potentially be tracked individually in real-time not only by the financial actors involved, but 
also by UNHCR and the NGOs that run reception centres and deliver the cards, UNHCR staff 
pointed out to us that data is not used for individual control or surveillance.71 The debit card 
is not immediately understandable either as the extension of the ‘migration industry’ that 
exploits migrant labour or as financialisation through the inclusion of migrant populations 
within financial circuits of profit.72 Such a focus on data extraction and on infrastructures of 
circulation draws attention to the multiplicity of political technologies through which 
migrants' lives are governed or what we call ‘biopolitics multiple’. 
Biopolitical technologies in the digital age increasingly rely on digital infrastructures 
that allow for the circulation and processing of data. These infrastructures are, however, 
difficult to set in place and to maintain. It is thus not surprising that humanitarian actors rely 
on financial institutions, which already have infrastructures of circulation, to deploy these in 
the government of refugee populations.73 We see a dual movement between the inside and 
outside of capital in the government of migration. It is not simply capital producing and 
transforming its ‘outsides’, but also humanitarianism incorporating its ‘outsides’, such as 
financial institutions, high-tech corporations and private actors.   
 Technologies of extraction are deployed to both supplement financial technologies of 
governing refugees’ movements and to produce value. Value is not understood here in an 
economic sense as profit or commodification of migrant labour, but as generated through 
data. That is to say, data is not only about refugees’ nationality, family situation, legal status 
and ‘unruly’ movements – this is the data collected during the registration and verification 
procedures for the debit card – but also the data about their transactions, purchases and 
mobility across the country. Value is connected to the potential and future uses of data to 
make refugees’ populations knowable, as temporary consumers. Indeed, by transforming 
refugee populations into an object of knowledge and mapping their consumption trends, 
humanitarian actors produce data that has value for other actors who aim to render migrants 
legible. Data also becomes a source of value for humanitarian actors, while corporate actors 
render previously unavailable categories of population (partially) legible. 
 
70 Revel, ‘Identity, nature, life: Three biopolitical deconstructions’. 
71 Research notes, 10 August 2018, Athens. 
72 Financialisation is the ‘process by which objects, practices, spaces and populations are converted 
into forms that are legible to financial institutions’. . 
73 UNHCR and Social Performance Task Force, ‘Serving refugee populations: The next financial 
inclusion frontier’,  available at https://sptf.info/images/Guidelines-for-FSPs-on-serving-refugee-
populations-March2017.pdf, last accessed 30 October 2017. 
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However, value also needs to be understood in relation to access to the 
infrastructures of digital circulation, which are produced and maintained by the financial 
partners in these projects. Through the datafication of refugees’ movements and lives, 
humanitarian actors gain access to the infrastructures of circulation of digital economy, which 
are also infrastructures for the differential government of migration, by granting access to the 
cash assistance some of them and excluding others. This is not to say that the profit made 
from the commodification of migrants’ bodies is not crucial in the ‘migration industry’.74 
Nevertheless, our analysis of extraction shows that we need to move beyond the 
understanding of biopolitics as filtering ‘good’ and ‘bad’ circulation and ‘social sorting’, in 
order to grasp the modes of control that are at play. Data extraction renders refugee 
movements and conduct governable, while re-inscribing hierarchies and disparities between 
different categories of refugees. Overall, these extractive technologies do not replace other 
biopolitical technologies but are deployed alongside them. In the next section, we turn to yet 
another different technology deployed in the contemporary government of migration by 
moving to another site of experimentation – Calais.  
 
 
Subtractive biopolitics 
 
The borderzone of Calais has long been a space of intensified biopolitical governmentality. 
Soon after the eviction of the Calais ‘jungle’ in October 2016, migrants had been encouraged 
to move to the newly established Centres of Hosting and Orientation (CAOs) located all over 
across France in order to submit their asylum claim.75 Yet, for many of them, this temporary 
humanitarian solution turned out to be a ‘spatial trap’, as they risked being sent back to the 
first EU member state they entered where they had been fingerprinted on the basis of the 
Dublin Regulation. In the span of a few weeks after the eviction of the Calais camp in 2016, 
hundreds of migrants returned to Calais from the CAOs, escaping what they saw as the trap 
of hosting centres. Since then, migrants in Calais have been subjected to arbitrary police 
arrests, even if they had acquired refugee status in another EU member state, and have been 
kept in detention for few days or weeks before being released again. 
NGOs and organisations such as Human Rights Watch and La Cimade have reported 
that migrants are hindered from settling in Calais and from leaving any trace of their presence: 
tents and sleeping bags are destroyed by the police and migrants are attacked at night with 
pepper spray.76 A Human Rights Watch report published in the summer of 2017 triggered a 
lot of media attention and a subsequent inquiry by the French Ministry of Interior. While 
 
74 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sorensen, The Migration industry and the Commercialization of 
International Migration. 
75 https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/hauts-de-france/pas-calais/calais/an-apres-
demantelement-42-migrants-jungle-ont-obtenu-asile-1352025.html.  
76 Human Rights Watch, ‘'Like living in hell'. Police Abuses Against Child and Adult Migrants in Calais’, 
Human Rights Watch, available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/07/26/living-hell/police-
abuses-against-child-and-adult-migrants-calais, last accessed 21 November 2017; Passeurs 
d'hospitalités, ‘Calais : nouvelles saisines contre les violences’,  available at 
https://passeursdhospitalites.wordpress.com/2017/04/15/calais-nouvelles-saisines-contre-les-
violences/, last accessed 14 December 2017; Maryline Baumard, ‘A Calais, un retour des migrants 
sous haute tension’, Le Monde 2017. 
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much public attention was focused on the use of tear gas and violence by the riot police in 
Calais, the report also reveals the French government’s accusations against humanitarian 
services that the latter ‘create an implication of permanence (un point de fixation) and attract 
more migrants to the region’.77 There have been constant attempts by the authorities to 
dismantle the material infrastructures put into place for supporting migrants providing food 
and water, and allowing them to take showers. The Human Rights Watch report cites the 
account given by one of the migrants, a 15-year-old boy: ‘‘They wake us up. Allez, allez,’ they 
say. But where can I go? After that, they come with spray’.78  
While much of the attention has been on the destruction of material infrastructures 
and spectacular violence, another effect of these biopolitical practices is what we can call, 
following Puar, the debilitation of racialised migrant bodies. 79  This incapacitation of 
infrastructures and bodies needs to be supplemented by technologies of biopolitical control 
that keep bodies and infrastructures on the move. In fact, the whole governmental rationality 
of the Calais borderzone has been defined through the prevention of ‘stabilisation’. Initially, 
this entailed refusals to provide showers, toilets and even to allow NGOs to bring food to the 
migrants in Calais. What is interesting about the injunction to move (allez, allez), which one 
of the two opening quotes of this article encapsulates well – ‘We are not there to harass and 
assault them, we are there to make them move’ –, is that it draws attention to biopolitical 
technologies that do not aim to stop, confine, identify or detain migrants. Rather, the police 
practices of rendering tents, blankets and sleeping bags unusable are indicative of a 
technology of continually making migrants move. This entails hindering and undermining 
migrants’ life spaces (lieux de vie) and the very material possibility to stay in a given place.80  
As NGOs and even government reports show, when migrants’ sleeping bags are 
sprayed by the police in Calais, this is not an attempt to hunt down migrants, identify or 
register them. Rather, it is simply to move them from visible areas – for instance from the city 
centre of Calais – and to move them without driving them to a specific place. While we focus 
here on migrants in Calais, such a technology that consists in making migrants move is 
enacted by state authorities in many European cities, for example in the Italian town of 
Ventimiglia, located at the French-Italian border. 
More than debilitation or maiming, there appears to be a mode of biopolitical 
governing through non-governing, a politics of making move ‘without any perspective of 
installation’ and with no exact destination.81 How can we account for modes of government 
 
77 Human Rights Watch, ‘'Like living in hell'. Police Abuses Against Child and Adult Migrants in Calais’ 
13. 
78 Human Rights Watch, ‘'Like living in hell'. Police Abuses Against Child and Adult Migrants in Calais’ 
16. 
79 Puar, The Right to Maim: Debility, capacity, disability. Other scholars have used the language of 
the politics of exhaustion. Leonie Ansems de Vries and Marta Welander, ‘Refugees, displacement, 
and the European ‘politics of exhaustion’’, Open Democracy, available at 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/mediterranean-journeys-in-hope/leonie-ansems-de-vries-marta-
welander/refugees-displacement-and-europ, last accessed 20 November 2017.  
80 Tribunal Administratif de Lille, ‘Requête de référé liberté (L. 521-2 CJA)’,  available at 
http://www.gisti.org/IMG/pdf/jur_requete_ta_lille_2017-03-13.pdf, last accessed 14 December 
2017. 
81 Chowra Makaremi and Carolina Kobelinsky, Enfermés dehors. Enquêtes sur le confinement des 
étrangers (Paris, Éditions Du Croquant, 2009), 18. 
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through non-registration and the apparent withdrawal of the will to govern? Critical 
geographers have spoken of ‘a continuum of violent inaction’ to designate the effects of 
destitution and suffering generated on migrants as a result of state's active withdrawal.82 
Through such an expression they highlight forms of violence that are not spectacular and do 
not let live or make die, or at least not in a direct way. Our account of subtraction partially 
engages with such a perspective, while at the same time drawing attention to the ambiguities 
of the apparent state’s withdrawal. Indeed, in Calais, a series of active interventions were 
required. As we illustrate later, what is at stake is not only a partial not-doing, but also pro-
active engagement that is actualised through a multiplication of local decrees, national laws, 
police operations and resources to dismantle migrants’ shelters, road blockages, as well as 
legal and infrastructural obstructions against locals who act in solidarity with the migrants.83  
We propose to understand these technologies of biopolitical control as subtractive. In 
her work on architecture, Keller Easterling associates subtraction with ‘building removal’, 
which is not simply negative but develops ‘active forms’ of spatial reorganisation. 84  For 
Easterling, subtraction ‘is not simply absence, but a moment in a set of exchanges and 
advances, aggressions and attritions that are part of most active organizations. They are 
capable of orchestrating the ebbs and flows – the appearance and disappearances – of 
buildings’.85 While Easterling proposes subtraction as active rather than negative form, her 
use remains too closely wedded to destruction. For us, subtraction is important exactly 
because it is neither destruction nor production. Subtraction is thus not equivalent to 
destruction and our aim is not to reintroduce a vocabulary of ‘negative biopolitics’ or 
‘necropolitics’. Mathematically, subtraction has addition as its opposed term. Etymologically, 
the verb ‘subtract’ is derived from the Latin subtrahere, ‘to draw or drag from under’.86 
Subtractive technologies orchestrate the ebbs and flows of migrant lives. We propose to 
analyse subtraction as ‘taking away terrain’ from migrants. We understand terrain here in the 
sense proposed by Stuart Elden, as ‘a relation of power, with a heritage in geology and the 
military, the control of which allows the establishment and maintenance of order’.87 
Subtraction allows us to understand biopolitical government beyond demolition, 
eviction, confinement and stopping in the Calais borderzone. These subtractive technologies 
neither take life nor make live, even as they make living much more difficult. If their effects 
are debilitating, they do not operate through maiming. They also do not extract profit from 
the encounters with migrants. What is most surprising and disturbing about these 
technologies is that, in ‘taking terrain away from migrants’, they operate on mobility. 
Subtractive biopolitics leads migrants to undertake convoluted hyper-mobilities. That is, 
migrants are forced to reroute their trajectories and to do the same route multiple times. 
 
82 Davies, Isakjee, and Dhesi, ‘Violent Inaction: The Necropolitical Experience of Refugees in Europe’, 
19. 
83 Amnesty International, ‘Targeting Solidarity: Criminalization and harrassment of people defending 
refugee and mgirant rights in northern France’,  available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR2103562019ENGLISH.PDF, last accessed 14 
October 2019. 
84 Easterling, Subtraction, 2-3. 
85 Easterling, Subtraction, 3. 
86 Oxford English Dictionary, "subtract, v.", Third Edition ed. (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
87 Stuart Elden, ‘Land, terrain, territory’, Progress in Human Geography 34, no. 6 (2010): 799-
817,804. 
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Taking terrain away from migrants goes beyond merely destructive operations; it his 
productive in an embodied and infrastructural sense – not allowing migrants to stay, 
destroying their collective spaces of life – and in a legal and political one – through the 
implementation of local decrees as well as by hampering access to the legal channels of 
asylum. Forced hyper-mobility is a means through which subtractive mechanisms are enacted 
and, simultaneously, one of the main effects it generates – as long as migrants are indirectly 
or violently hampered from staying.  
While migrants are increasingly restricted in their tempos and autonomy of 
movement, this is not exactly a sort of strandedness, nor confinement. It is also not simply a 
question of deceleration. 88  Rather, experiences of strandedness are combined with the 
disruption of migrants’ movements and stay. This can take place through measures of forced 
mobility or mobility without an end point or goal; but it can also consist in temporal 
suspension – protracted moments of legal limbo or of indefinite wait. Subtractive 
technologies trouble the migrants’ presence in space and hinder their mobility, not by (fully) 
blocking them but, on the contrary, by forcing them to undertake convoluted movements. 
These subtractive operations do not need to destroy infrastructures or maim bodies. 
Infrastructures themselves are rendered mobile, as in the case of mobile water or shower 
provision in Calais. To have access to food, water or even legal processes, migrants are made 
hyper-mobile.89  For instance, between 2017 and 2018, migrants stranded in Calais were 
forced to take food from volunteers at specific time slots in punctual sites and then to stay 
away from there for the rest of the day.90 
Taking terrain away from migrants also entails that migrants are not only hampered 
in their mobility; more than that, their their movements are accelerated, but in ‘cramped 
spaces’.91 On the one hand, these subtractive technologies concern the very possibility to 
move on, as well as to remain in a given place without being ‘illegalised’. On the other, the 
erratic geographies that migrants are forced to undertake in order to reach a certain place, 
as well as the multiple ‘bounces’ migrants are subjected to at the internal borders of Europe 
show that mobility is used as a technology of biopolitical control that subtracts the autonomy 
of movement. Taking terrain away from migrants does not necessarily involve geographic 
fixation, although migrants are forced, directly or indirectly, to undertake certain legal and 
geographic paths, and not taking others. The forced hyper-mobility that migrants experience 
 
88 Vassilis Tsianos and Serhat Karakayali, ‘Transnational migration and the emergence of the 
European border regime: an ethnographic analysis’, European Journal of Social Theory 13, no. 3 
(2010): 373-87. 
89 Maire de la Ville de Calais, ‘Arrêté portant interdiction des occupations abusives, prolongées et 
répétées de la zone industrielle des Dunes’, Gisti, available at 
https://www.gisti.org/IMG/pdf/arrete_2017-03-02_calais-maire.pdf, last accessed 14 October 2019. 
90 Tribunal administratif de Lille, ‘Ordonnance du 22 mars 2017. N°1702397’,  available at 
https://www.gisti.org/IMG/pdf/jur_ta-lille_2017-03-22_1702397.pdf, last accessed 14 
October 2019. 
91 William Walters and Barbara Lüthi, ‘The Politics of Cramped Space: Dilemmas of Action, 
Containment and Mobility’, International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 29, no. 4 (2016): 
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in their so-called ‘secondary movements’92 in Europe is a subtractive operation that leaves 
asylum law in place, but subtracts access to it by obstructing migrants from applying and by 
preventively illegalising them93 . It does not explicitly deny nor destroy access to asylum 
claims. However, claiming asylum requires a mode of localisation, and the establishment of a 
relation through registration, reporting, and data. Hence, hampering access to the asylum 
system or making it hard constitute modes of subtraction that end up in debilitating migrants. 
To subtract is not only to take away the material infrastructures of existence, but also 
to use the law in a political-strategic way to take away terrain from migrants. Using the law 
as a subtractive technology means that certain actions are not forbidden or repressed but 
their conditions of possibility are rendered mobile and changeable. Subtraction relies on what 
appear to be ‘innocuous details – an invisible build-up of neglect or a silent form of attrition,’94 
which nonetheless come to disrupt migrants’ movements. Subtractive technologies mobilise 
small and apparently insignificant details that don’t amount to open antagonism, destruction 
or death.  
The judicial hearings conducted by the Court of Lille about the conditions of migrants 
in Calais can help shed light on how subtractive biopolitics mobilises the nuances of the law 
and building on minimal differences. In fact, both NGOs and the French authorities refer to 
humanitarian measures, such as providing shelters, food and showers to migrants, not in 
unconditional way (in support or against) but, rather by introducing spatio-temporal 
delimitations. For instance, NGOs deployed in Calais demanded that migrants could access 
‘an emergency shelter within 48 hours’ and to open food distribution points for ‘three hours 
every time’ during the day, such as ‘between 11:30am and 14:30pm’ and ‘between 6pm and 
9pm’.95 The Lille Administrative Court called for the implementation of showers and water 
points in the Calais area: the Municipality of Calais has been requested to decide, together 
with local organisations, ‘the number and the exact location of water points and latrines’ as 
well as the access to the showers.96 In the end, the Prefecture and the Municipality let locals 
and NGOs bring food to migrants only in a specific site in the industrial area of the city, two 
hours per day in the beginning (from 6pm to 8pm) and then extended also to lunch time (12 
to 2 pm). Until September 2017, the Municipality of Calais refused to install showers in the 
area, despite the Court judgement, as the showers were deemed to constitute a pull factor 
and points of stabilisation (‘points de fixation’) for migrants to come to Calais.97  
 
92 ‘Secondary movements’ is an expression employed in EU documents to designate migrants' erratic 
routes across Europe that result from the spatial restrictions imposed by the Dublin Regulation, 
rejected asylum applications and push back operations. In our view, such an expression is highly 
problematic as it strengthens a representation of migrant journeys as linear routes- as movements 
from a point A to a point B. 
93 For instance, by giving decrees of expulsion before they could lodge the asylum application.  
94 Keller Easterling, Extrastatecraft: The power of infrastructure space (London: Verso, 2014), Loc 
2490. 
95 Tribunal Administratif de Lille, ‘M. X et les autres. Ordonnance du 26 juin 2017 ’,  available at 
https://bloglandotavocatsnet.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/1705379.pdf, last accessed 14 
December 2017. 
96 Tribunal Administratif de Lille, ‘M. X et les autres. Ordonnance du 26 juin 2017 ’. 
97 Natasha Bouchart, ‘Lettre au collectif des associations’,  available at 
http://www.gisti.org/IMG/pdf/lettre_2017-03-09_calais-maire.pdf, last accessed 14 December 
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These spatio-temporal delimitations force migrants to become hyper-mobile between 
different sites and render the conditions of access to food, water and infrastructures mobile 
themselves. The NGOs change, the sites change, the times change. Food can be accessed in 
one site, medical care in another and at a different time, lunch elsewhere than dinner and so 
on. This subtractive ‘hold’ on migrants’ lives is enacted not only by taking material and 
existential terrain away from migrants through police interventions; they also take place 
through legal, semi-legal and administrative restrictions in the access to basic needs. In Calais, 
‘police practices do not simply speak to an undoing of the very conditions of liveability, but of 
the destruction of conditions of collectivity’.98 This also clearly emerges from the decrees of 
the Calais Municipality, which highlight the risks associated with migrant ‘grouping’ in some 
areas of the city.99 Therefore, a gaze on the multiple fences, the police checks and the x-ray 
controls at the port of Calais enforced to prevent migrants from going to the UK and thus 
block their movements only partially captures the ways in which migrants’ presence and 
movements are governed. Taking showers, sleeping and eating appear to be strictly 
conditioned upon detailed – but changeable – spatio-temporal restrictions. Subtraction is not 
only about taking away, but also about reorganising the terrains of liveability and collectivity.  
Such a focus on legal texts that trace boundaries of humanitarian intervention sheds 
light on the peculiarity of the role of the law in governing migration through practices of 
subtraction. Local decrees and court sentences that address migrants’ presence in Calais build 
and introduce minimal differences to establish the conditions and the extent to which 
migrants can be the object of solidarity activities as well as of state’s ‘humanitarian’ 
interventions. In this context, the strategic use of law hinges neither on the norm as ‘the 
criterion of partition of the individuals’100 nor on the exception. The introduction of minimal 
differences in municipal decrees and state documents does not in fact respond to the 
rationale of the exception, predicated upon neat boundaries between what is allowed and 
what is forbidden. Rather, it consists in deploying apparently innocuous legal details that 
subtract from the applicability of law itself. Subtractive technologies establish and fix 
differences, generate asymmetrical relationships and dispose bodies in space so that migrants 
are trapped in ‘a lesser form of being’101  through hyper-mobility. Indeed, forced hyper-
mobility contributes, we suggest, to debilitate and harm those who are racialised as migrants. 
 
Conclusion: 'Biopolitics Multiple’ 
 
This article has explored biopolitical technologies in the government of migration, which 
cannot be grasped through the making live/letting die couplet. We have proposed to 
understand the pluralisation, dispersal and proliferation of biopolitical technologies of 
migration control as ‘biopolitics multiple’. Through this coinage, we have drawn attention to 
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biopolitical technologies that are characterised by heterogeneity, but also that at the same 
time ‘hold together’ through a sort of inclusive disjunction: in fact, migrants’ lives and 
mobilities are contained and obstructed precisely through such heterogeneity that often 
translates into a substantial opacity and disorientation for migrants and even NGOs. However, 
our conceptualisation of ‘biopolitics multiple’ is not limited to the field of migration. The 
analytical focus on migration and on two specific borderzones have enabled us to rethink 
biopolitical modes of governing in relation to infrastructures of mobility and circulation. 
Therefore, this paper has made a twofold theoretical contribution to the critical literature on 
migration and analyses of biopolitics more broadly.   Conceptualising extraction and 
subtraction as technologies of government has allowed us to analyse the biopolitical 
governing of migration beyond ‘making live and letting die’ or the filtering of good and bad 
circulation. However, focusing on extraction and subtraction does not mean ignoring power’s 
grasp over life and death; engaging with biopolitics multiple through the angle of extraction 
and subtraction helps account for the peculiar and heterogeneous ‘hold’ over migrants’ lives.  
Firstly, focusing on the implementation of prepaid cards for refugees in Greece, we 
have explored the extraction of data and its circulation in digital infrastructures that connect 
humanitarian organisations and financial institutions. While a growing scholarship has 
explored the processes of commodification of the body and the modes of differential 
inclusion connected to extractive processes, we have drawn attention to extraction in relation 
to data circulation and refugees’ mobility. New modes of cash assistance and debit card use 
in governing migration can be read as extractive technologies that datafy refugees’ 
movements and enable access to the material infrastructures of digital economy. Secondly, 
through an account of migrant governmentality in Calais, we have highlighted different 
technologies of government that do not work either through ‘making live’ or ‘letting die’. We 
have called these technologies subtractive, as they withdraw or ‘take away’ material, legal 
and existential terrain from migrants, while entrapping them in convoluted geographies of 
erratic movements.  
In neither of these cases can we use the national territory-population nexus to grasp 
the peculiarities of biopolitics multiple. The focus on Calais has shown that migrants are 
governed not through constant monitoring, but through subtractive mechanisms that make 
their presence invisible to the citizens, while at the same time hampering the formation of 
collective subjects that could build spaces of life. The case of Calais has also foregrounded 
how migrants are spatially disciplined by being constantly displaced more than being 
managed into a defined space. In this respect, we suggest that further research can situate 
subtractive operations within a history of tactics of dissuasion, harassment and containment 
that migrants who arrived there have been subjected to. The implementation of financial-
digital technologies in humanitarian interventions highlights a fundamental discrepancy 
between territorial governmentality and circuits of data exchange that have tangible and 
direct effects on migrants’ lives. 
By focusing on technologies of subtraction and extraction, we proposed to advance 
work that has challenged the binary oppositions that have tended to structure the literature 
on biopolitics: inclusion and exclusion, affirmative and negative biopolitics, making 
live/making die. In turn, by rethinking biopolitics in the light of political technologies used for 
regaining control over ‘unruly’ migration, it become possible to move beyond the binary 
opposition between migrants’ agency and resistance on the one side, and migrant victimhood 
on the other. In fact, such a binary opposition does not capture the heterogeneous effects 
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that political technologies generate on migrants’ lives, as well as the tactics that migrants 
engage in. A more thorough engagement with migrants’ struggles and practices of resistance 
against modes of subjection through extraction and subtraction could be the object of future 
research. 
 
 
 
